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BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS AND INTERFERENCES

In re Application of:	:	Before the Examiner:
Chan et al.	:	Won, Michael Young
	:	
Serial No.: 10/732,751	:	Group Art Unit: 2155
	:	
Filing Date: December 10, 2003	:	
	:	
Title: METHOD FOR	:	IBM Corporation
MANAGING COMMERCE	:	Dept. T81/Bldg. 503
CONTEXTS	:	P.O. Box 12195
	:	3039 Cornwallis Road
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APPEAL BRIEF

Mail Stop Appeal Brief-Patents
Commissioner for Patents
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, VA 22313-1450

I. REAL PARTY IN INTEREST

The real party in interest is International Business Machines Corporation, which is the assignee of the entire right, title and interest in the above-identified patent application.

II. RELATED APPEALS AND INTERFERENCES

There are no other appeals or interferences known to Appellants, Appellants' legal representative or assignee which will directly affect or be directly affected by or have a bearing on the Board's decision in the pending appeal.

III. STATUS OF CLAIMS

Claims 1-7 are pending in the Application. Claims 8-21 were cancelled. Claims 1-7 stand rejected. Claims 1-7 are appealed.

IV. STATUS OF AMENDMENTS

Appellants submitted an amendment (January 30, 2008) following receipt of the final office action (October 30, 2007) where the amendment cancelled claims 8-21.

V. SUMMARY OF CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER

Independent Claim 1:

In one embodiment of the present invention, for a data processing system, a method for managing commerce contexts, the data processing system being associated with a direct commerce context and a temporary commerce context, the data processing system being operatively coupled to memory having a session area. Specification, page 9, lines 22-29; Specification, page 12, lines 20-21; Specification, page 12, lines 24-25; Specification, page 12, line 27 – page 13, line 1; Specification, page 13, lines 2-4; Specification, page 14, lines 13-14; Figure 3, element 50; Figure 5, elements 203, 206, 212; Figure 6, element 250. The method comprises the step of receiving a client request associated with a commerce context parameter. Specification, page 13, lines 4-7; Specification, page 13, line 23 – page 14, line 9. The method further comprises determining the commerce context associated with the commerce context parameter. Specification, page 13, lines 14-15; Specification, page 14, lines 10-12; Specification, page 14, lines 20-21.

VI. GROUND OF REJECTION TO BE REVIEWED ON APPEAL

A. Claims 1-4 and 6-7 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §102(e) as being anticipated Clark et al. (U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2003/0088617) (hereinafter "Clark").

B. Claim 5 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Clark in view of Hunt et al. (U.S. Patent No. 6,223,215) (hereinafter "Hunt").

VII. ARGUMENT

- A. Claims 1-4 and 6-7 are not properly rejected under 35 U.S.C. §102(e) as being anticipated by Clark.

The Examiner has rejected claims 1-4 and 6-7 under 35 U.S.C. §102(e) as being anticipated by Clark. Appellants respectfully traverse these rejections for at least the reasons stated below.

For a claim to be anticipated under 35 U.S.C. §102, each and every claim limitation must be found within the cited prior art reference and arranged as required by the claim. M.P.E.P. §2131.

1. Claim 1 is not anticipated by Clark.

The Examiner cites paragraph [0043] of Clark as disclosing "receiving a client request associated with a commerce context parameter" as recited in claim 1. Office Action (7/3/2007), page 3; Office action (10/30/2007), page 3. Appellants respectfully traverse.

Clark instead discloses that at 120, the user request 120 is processed by the master controller 70 to obtain the page name parameter from other provided requested information (if null, the page name parameter remains the home page). [0043].

Hence, Clark discloses processing the user request to obtain the page name parameter from other provided requested information.

There is no language in the cited passage that discloses receiving a client request associated with a commerce context parameter. Instead, Clark discloses that the master controller 70 recognizes that an identifier for a particular feature content page 88 (e.g., page name parameter) has not been supplied by the user. [0042]. Clark further discloses that the master controller 70 then sets the page name parameter to the home page. [0042]. Hence, the page name parameter is not provided via the user request, but instead is obtained using other information as

specifically recited in cited paragraph [0043]. Thus, Clark does not disclose all of the limitations of claims 1, and thus Clark does not anticipate claim 1. M.P.E.P. §2131.

Further, if the Examiner is equating the page name parameter of Clark as the claimed commerce context parameter and equating user request 120 of Clark as the claimed client request, then user request 120 is not associated with the page name parameter since the page name parameter is not obtained from user request 120 as discussed above. Hence, Clark does not disclose receiving a client request associated with a commerce context parameter. Thus, Clark does not disclose all of the limitations of claims 1, and thus Clark does not anticipate claim 1. M.P.E.P. §2131.

In response to Appellants' above arguments, the Examiner asserts that since Clark teaches receiving a request from a client and that since Clark's invention relates to e-commerce (Examiner relies upon paragraph [0006] of Clark for that assertion), then Clark necessarily teaches receiving a client request associated with a commerce context parameter. Office Action (10/30/2007), page 10. Appellants respectfully traverse. While Clark does mentions e-commerce business in paragraph [0006] and while Clark teaches receiving a request from the client, the above-cited claim limitation specifically states receiving a client request associated with a commerce context parameter. The Examiner cannot ignore claim language. *See In re Wilson*, 424 F.2d 1382, 1385, 165 U.S.P.Q. 494, 496 (C.C.P.A. 1970); M.P.E.P. §2131. Appellants are not generally claiming "e-commerce" or generally claiming "receiving a request from a client." Instead, Appellants are claiming receiving a request associated with a commerce context parameter. Thus, Clark does not disclose all of the limitations of claims 1, and thus Clark does not anticipate claim 1. M.P.E.P. §2131.

Further, the Examiner cites paragraphs [0028 and 0043] of Clark as disclosing "determining the commerce context associated with said commerce context parameter" as recited in claim 1. Office Action (7/3/2007), page 3; Office Action (10/30/2007), page 3. Appellants respectfully traverse.

Clark instead discloses that the master controller 70 obtains a page name parameter that is used to determine which feature content 88 should receive the user request 42 information. [0028]. Additionally, Clark discloses that at 120, the user request 120 is processed by the master controller 70 to obtain the page name parameter from other provided requested information (if null, the page name parameter remains the home page). [0043]. Further, Clark discloses that the master controller 70 acts to get the feature content page 88 associated with the obtained page name parameter or to throw an exception if such a page 88 does not exist. [0043].

Hence, Clark discloses obtaining a page name parameter that is used to determine which feature content 88 should receive the user request 42 information. Further, Clark discloses that the page name parameter is obtained from information other than the user request.

There is no language in the cited passage that discloses determining the commerce context associated with the commerce context parameter. As discussed in Appellants' Specification, the commerce context parameter, in one embodiment, may refer to the parameters (e.g., StoreID) that are used to identify a channel store context or a supplier store context. See, for example, Specification, page 13, lines 4-8; Specification, page 14, lines 3-9. The Examiner has not provided any evidence that a page name parameter corresponds to the claimed commerce context parameter as defined in Appellants' Specification. A page name parameter, as used in Clark, refers to the Uniform Resource Locator (URL) of a web page. Thus, Clark does not disclose all of the limitations of claims 1, and thus Clark does not anticipate claim 1. M.P.E.P. §2131.

Additionally, the Examiner has made some comments on pages 8-9 in the final Office Action which Appellants would like to address for the record. The Examiner states that the Examiner interprets a "direct commerce context" and "temporary commerce context" as simply referring to a series of web pages. Office Action (10/30/2007), page 8. Appellants respectfully disagree and point out that

Appellants' Specification specifically discloses that a commerce context, in one embodiment, may contain information such as the store supported language, currency, directory for web assets such as store pages, and various store policies. See, for example, Appellants' Specification, page 12, lines 20-25.

Further, the Examiner asserts that terms "direct commerce context" and "temporary commerce context" are indefinite because the Specification does not clearly define them. Office Action (10/30/2007), page 9. Appellants respectfully traverse. Appellants kindly direct the Board's attention to at least page 12, line 13 – page 13, line 8 of Appellants' Specification for a discussion of one embodiment of "direct commerce context" and "temporary commerce context." Appellants respectfully assert that one having ordinary skill in the art can determine the scope of the limitations involving "direct commerce context" and "temporary commerce context."

Further, the Examiner asserts that Clark discloses "a session area" as recited in claim 1 based on Clark teaching a memory in paragraph [0011]. Office Action (10/30/2007), page 9. While Clark discloses a memory in paragraph [0011], Appellants claimed "operatively coupled to memory having a session area" as recited in claim 1. The Examiner has to show that the memory disclosed in paragraph [0011] of Clark includes a session area, as defined in Appellants' Specification (see, for example, page 14, lines 13-14 of Appellants' Specification). The Examiner has not provided such evidence. Hence, Clark does not disclose all of the limitations of claim 1, and hence Clark does not anticipate claim 1. M.P.E.P. §2131.

2. Claims 2-4 and 6-7 are not anticipated by Clark for at least the above-stated reasons that claim 1 is not anticipated by Clark.

Claims 2-4 and 6-7 each recite the combinations of features of independent claim 1, and hence claims 2-4 and 6-7 are not anticipated by Clark for at least the above-stated reasons that claim 1 is not anticipated by Clark.

3. Claim 2 is not anticipated by Clark.

The Examiner cites paragraph [0043] of Clark as disclosing "wherein the step of determining the commerce context associated with said commerce context parameter includes determining whether said commerce context parameter identifies said direct commerce context or said temporary commerce context" as recited in claim 2. Office Action (7/3/2007), pages 5-6; Office Action (10/30/2007), page 5. Appellants respectfully traverse.

As stated above, Clark instead discloses obtaining the page name parameter from other provided requested information.

There is no language in the cited passage that discloses determining whether the commerce context parameter identifies the direct commerce context or the temporary commerce context. Thus, Clark does not disclose all of the limitations of claim 2, and thus Clark does not anticipate claim 2. M.P.E.P. §2131.

In response to Appellants' above arguments, the Examiner asserts that the page name parameter identifies a particular page and therefore discloses the above-cited claim limitation since it allegedly does not matter that the claims state a "direct commerce context" or a "temporary commerce context." Office Action (10/30/2007), page 10. Appellants respectfully traverse.

The Examiner is ignoring claim language. The Examiner cannot simply ignore the terms "direct commerce context" or "temporary commerce context." These terms have meaning (as discussed above) and the Examiner must find a reference that discloses determining whether the commerce context parameter identifies the direct commerce context or the temporary commerce context in order to establish a *prima facie* case of anticipation in rejecting claim 2. M.P.E.P. §2131. Appellants are not claiming "identifying a particular page" as suggested by the Examiner. Thus, Clark does not disclose all of the limitations of claim 2, and thus Clark does not anticipate claim 2. M.P.E.P. §2131.

4. Claim 3 is not anticipated by Clark.

The Examiner cites paragraphs [0037 and 0047] of Clark as disclosing "constructing the commerce context associated with said commerce context parameter" as recited in claim 3. Office Action (7/3/2007), page 6; Office Action (10/30/2007), page 6. Appellants respectfully traverse.

Clark instead discloses that to facilitate feature development, a Model 2 JSP standard can be followed with the feature content or content page 88 being implemented by JSP (Java™ server page) technology, which is a well-known technique for dynamically building graphical user interfaces based on request 42 parameters with JSP pages that include a mixture of code and content that is recognized by browsers at the clients 50, 54, 58. [0037]. Clark further discloses that the presentation container 76 begins to build the response 44 by including at least a first part of the repeated "wrap around" presentation. [0047].

Hence, Clark discloses building graphical user interfaces as well as discloses that the presentation container 76 begins to build the response 44 by including at least a first part of the repeated "wrap around" presentation.

There is no language in the cited passages that discloses constructing the commerce context associated with the commerce context parameter. Thus, Clark does not disclose all of the limitations of claim 3, and thus Clark does not anticipate claim 3. M.P.E.P. §2131.

In response to Appellants' above arguments, the Examiner asserts that Appellants' arguments fail to comply with 37 C.F.R. §1.111(b). Office Action (10/30/2007), page 10. Appellants respectfully traverse. Appellants have reviewed Clark, and in particular the passages cited by the Examiner. Appellants have not identified any language that discloses the language indicated above. It is the Examiner's burden, and not Appellants, to establish a *prima facie* case of anticipation which is established by the Examiner citing to a references that discloses each and every claim limitation. M.P.E.P. §2131. The Examiner's reference, Clark, does not disclose constructing the commerce context associated with the commerce context

parameter. Thus, Clark does not disclose all of the limitations of claim 3, and thus Clark does not anticipate claim 3. M.P.E.P. §2131.

5. Claim 4 is not anticipated by Clark.

The Examiner cites paragraph [0043] of Clark as disclosing "wherein said commerce context parameter is included in said client request" as recited in claim 4. Office Action (7/3/2007), page 6; Office Action (10/30/2007), page 6. Appellants respectfully traverse.

Clark instead discloses that the master controller 70 acts to get the feature content page 88 associated with the obtained page name parameter or to throw an exception if such a page 88 does not exist. [0043].

There is no language in the cited passage that discloses that the commerce context parameter is included in the client request. The Examiner had previously cited to user request 120 of Clark as disclosing the claimed client request. The Examiner had also previously cited to the page name parameter as allegedly disclosing the claimed commerce context parameter. There is no language in Clark that discloses that the page name parameter is included in user request 120. Clark specifically discloses that the page name parameter is not included in user request 120. See, for example, paragraphs [0042-0043] of Clark. Neither is there any language in Clark that discloses a commerce context parameter that is included in user request 120. Thus, Clark does not disclose all of the limitations of claim 4, and thus Clark does not anticipate claim 4. M.P.E.P. §2131.

In response to Appellants' above arguments, the Examiner asserts that Appellants' arguments fail to comply with 37 C.F.R. §1.111(b). Office Action (10/30/2007), page 10. Appellants respectfully traverse. Appellants have reviewed Clark, and in particular the passages cited by the Examiner. Appellants have not identified any language that discloses the language indicated above. It is the Examiner's burden, and not Appellants, to establish a *prima facie* case of anticipation which is established by the Examiner citing to a references that discloses each and

every claim limitation. M.P.E.P. §2131. The Examiner's reference, Clark, does not disclose that the commerce context parameter is included in the client request. Thus, Clark does not disclose all of the limitations of claim 4, and thus Clark does not anticipate claim 4. M.P.E.P. §2131.

6. Claim 6 is not anticipated by Clark.

The Examiner cites paragraph [0044] of Clark as disclosing "wherein said client request further includes a second commerce context parameter, and wherein said method further comprises the step of defining said second commerce context parameter in the session area" as recited in claim 6. Office Action (7/3/2007), page 6; Office Action (10/30/2007), page 6. Appellants respectfully traverse.

Clark instead discloses that steps 120 and 130 typically occur in response to a user of a client 50, 54, 58 operating their browser to navigate to a menu item or page function and the master controller 70 and abstract controller 72 handling the request 42 based on feature content 88 properties. [0044].

There is no language in the cited passage that discloses that the client request further includes a second commerce context parameter. The Examiner had previously cited user request 120 of Clark as disclosing the claimed client request. There is no language in Clark that discloses that user request 120 includes a first and a second commerce context parameter. Neither is there any language in the cited passage that discloses defining the second commerce context parameter in the session area. Thus, Clark does not disclose all of the limitations of claim 6, and thus Clark does not anticipate claim 6. M.P.E.P. §2131.

In response to Appellants' above arguments, the Examiner asserts that Appellants' arguments fail to comply with 37 C.F.R. §1.111(b). Office Action (10/30/2007), page 10. Appellants respectfully traverse. Appellants have reviewed Clark, and in particular the passages cited by the Examiner. Appellants have not identified any language that discloses the language indicated above. It is the Examiner's burden, and not Appellants, to establish a *prima facie* case of anticipation

which is established by the Examiner citing to a references that discloses each and every claim limitation. M.P.E.P. §2131. The Examiner's reference, Clark, does not disclose that the client request further includes a second commerce context parameter. Neither does Clark disclose defining the second commerce context parameter in the session area. Thus, Clark does not disclose all of the limitations of claim 6, and thus Clark does not anticipate claim 6. M.P.E.P. §2131.

7. Claim 7 is not anticipated by Clark.

The Examiner cites paragraph [0048] of Clark as disclosing "executing said client request using said constructed commerce context" as recited in claim 7. Office Action (7/3/2007), page 7; Office Action (10/30/2007), page 6. Appellants respectfully traverse.

Clark instead discloses that the built response 44 is then returned and the presentation displayed to the user. [0048].

There is no language in the cited passage that discloses executing the client request using the constructed commerce context. Thus, Clark does not disclose all of the limitations of claim 7, and thus Clark does not anticipate claim 7. M.P.E.P. §2131.

In response to Appellants' above arguments, the Examiner asserts that Appellants' arguments fail to comply with 37 C.F.R. §1.111(b). Office Action (10/30/2007), page 10. Appellants respectfully traverse. Appellants have reviewed Clark, and in particular the passages cited by the Examiner. Appellants have not identified any language that discloses the language indicated above. It is the Examiner's burden, and not Appellants, to establish a *prima facie* case of anticipation which is established by the Examiner citing to a references that discloses each and every claim limitation. M.P.E.P. §2131. The Examiner's reference, Clark, does not disclose executing the client request using the constructed commerce context. Thus, Clark does not disclose all of the limitations of claim 7, and thus Clark does not anticipate claim 7. M.P.E.P. §2131.

B. Claim 5 is not properly rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Clark in view of Hunt.

Most if not all inventions arise from a combination of old elements. *See In re Rouffet*, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1453, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Obviousness is determined from the vantage point of a hypothetical person having ordinary skill in the art to which the patent pertains. *In re Rouffet*, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1453, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Therefore, an Examiner may often find every element of a claimed invention in the prior art. *Id.* However, identification in the prior art of each individual part claimed is insufficient to defeat patentability of the whole claimed invention. *See Id.* In order to establish a *prima facie* case of obviousness, the Examiner must show reasons that the skilled artisan, confronted with the same problems as the inventor and with no knowledge of the claimed invention, would select the elements from the cited prior art references for combination in the manner claimed. *In re Rouffet*, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1453, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The Examiner must provide articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness. *In re Kahn*, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (cited approvingly in *KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.*, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385, 1396 (U.S. 2007)).

In order to sustain the rejection of claim 5 for obviousness, the Examiner has to provide some rational connection between the cited passage that is the source of the Examiner's reasoning and the missing claim limitation. As understood by Appellants, the Examiner admits that Clark does not teach "wherein said commerce context parameter is defined in the session area" as recited in claim 5. Office Action (7/3/2007), page 7; Office Action (10/30/2007), page 7. The Examiner asserts that Hunt teaches the above-cited claim limitation. *Id.* The Examiner's reasoning for modifying Clark with Hunt to include the above-cited claim limitation is "because Clark teaches that the invention is session-based system where a reference is established (see page 4, [0030])." *Id.* Appellants respectfully contend that this does not provide reasons that the skilled artisan, confronted with the same problems as the inventor and with no knowledge of the claimed invention, would modify Clark to

include the above-indicated missing claim limitation of claim 5. Clark teaches that the abstract controller 72 further acts to set the properties of the abstract model interface 74 and to establish a reference to the abstract model interface 74 as a service session attribute or a service request attribute. [0030]. There is no language in Clark (and in particular paragraph [0030]) to suggest that by having the commerce context parameter defined in the session area (missing claim limitation), the invention can be a session-based system. The cited passage in Clark that mentions that the abstract controller 72 acts to set the properties of the abstract model interface 74 does not provide appropriate reasoning for modifying Clark to incorporate the above-cited missing claim limitation. Accordingly, the Examiner has not presented a *prima facie* case of obviousness for rejecting claim 5. *KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.*, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385, 1396 (U.S. 2007); *In re Rouffet*, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1453, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

Further, Clark teaches away from the asserted modification. Clark addresses the problem of controlling access to applications and their features in a network setting that facilitates development of the applications and building or modifying application features. [0008]. Clark solves the problem at least in part by providing a service portal system in which a portal framework is provided for each service application to provide a single entry and exit point for the application. [0009]. That "Clark teaches that the invention is a session-based system where a reference is established," as suggested by the Examiner, does not explain why one skilled in the art would modify Clark to have the commerce context parameter be defined in the session area. Clark is not concerned with being a session-based system. Further, Appellants respectfully contend that there is no rational connection between having the invention of Clark be a session-based system and having the commerce context parameter be defined in the session area. Hence, the Examiner's rationale does not provide reasons that the skilled artisan, confronted with the same problems as the inventor and with no knowledge of the claimed invention, would modify Clark to include the missing claim limitation of claim 5. Accordingly, the Examiner has not

presented a *prima facie* case of obviousness for rejecting claim 5. *KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.*, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385, 1396 (U.S. 2007); *In re Rouffet*, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1453, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

In response to Appellants' above arguments, the Examiner relies upon the rationale of "the simple substitution of one known element for another or the mere application of a known technique to a piece of prior art ready for improvement" in support of modifying Clark with Hunt to include the limitation of "wherein said commerce context parameter is defined in the session area" as recited in claim 5. Office Action (10/30/2007), page 11. Appellants respectfully traverse.

As indicated in M.P.E.P. §2143, "the simple substitution" rationale requires the Examiner to find that the substituted components and their functions were known in the art. Further, according to M.P.E.P. §2143, "the simple substitution" rationale requires the Examiner to make a finding that ordinary skill in the art could have substituted one known element for another, and the results of the substitution would have been predictable. The Examiner has not explained what element in Clark would be substituted with having a commerce context parameter that is defined in the session area (missing claim limitation). In order for the Examiner to rely upon this rationale, the Examiner must identify the element in Clark to be substituted with the missing claim limitation. The Examiner also must provide evidence that shows that the results of the substitution would have been predictable. The Examiner has not done so. Hence, the Examiner's rationale does not support a finding of a *prima facie* case of obviousness in rejecting claim 5.

Further, as indicated in M.P.E.P. §2143, the "applying a known technique to a known device (method or product) ready for improvement to yield predictable results" rationale requires the Examiner to make a finding that the prior art contained a known technique that is applicable to the base device (method or product); and to make a finding that one of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that applying the known technique would have yielded predictable results and resulted in

an improved system. The Examiner has not made any findings that show that the prior art contained a known technique. Further, the Examiner has not even identified what the known technique would be. Is the Examiner asserting that having the commerce context parameter be defined in the session area a known technique? Further, the Examiner has not shown that the known technique in the prior art is applicable to the base device disclosed in Clark. Neither has the Examiner provided any evidence that one of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that applying this known technique would have yielded predictable results and resulted in an improved system. Hence, the Examiner's rationale does not support a finding of a *prima facie* case of obviousness in rejecting claim 5.

Additionally, the Examiner makes the statement that defining parameters in an area of memory is a known technique. Office Action (10/30/2007), page 12. Appellants respectfully point out that claim 5 recites "wherein said commerce context parameter is defined in the session area." Appellants are not merely claiming defining parameters in an area of memory. The Examiner is to interpret the claim limitations in light of Appellants' Specification. *In re Hyatt*, 211 F.3d 1367, 1372, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1664, 1667 (Fed. Cir. 2000); M.P.E.P. §2111. The Examiner has not construed "commerce context parameter" or "session area" in light of Appellants' Specification. Appellants respectfully assert that having the commerce context parameter be defined in the session area is not a known technique that is neither challenging nor difficult. Thus, the Examiner has not established a *prima facie* case of obviousness under 35 U.S.C. §103(a). M.P.E.P. §2143.

VIII. CONCLUSION


For the reasons noted above, the rejections of claims 1-7 are in error. Appellants respectfully request reversal of the rejections and allowance of claims 1-7.

Respectfully submitted,

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CLAIMS APPENDIX

1. For a data processing system, a method for managing commerce contexts, the data processing system being associated with a direct commerce context and a temporary commerce context, the data processing system being operatively coupled to memory having a session area, said method comprising the steps of:
receiving a client request associated with a commerce context parameter; and
determining the commerce context associated with said commerce context parameter.
2. The method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the step of determining the commerce context associated with said commerce context parameter includes determining whether said commerce context parameter identifies said direct commerce context or said temporary commerce context.
3. The method as claimed in claim 2, further comprising the step of constructing the commerce context associated with said commerce context parameter.
4. The method as claimed in claim 3, wherein said commerce context parameter is included in said client request.
5. The method as claimed in claim 3, wherein said commerce context parameter is defined in the session area.
6. The method as claimed in claim 4, wherein said client request further includes a second commerce context parameter, and wherein said method further comprises the step of defining said second commerce context parameter in the session area.
7. The method as claimed in claim 6, further comprising the step of executing said client request using said constructed commerce context.

EVIDENCE APPENDIX

No evidence was submitted pursuant to §§1.130, 1.131, or 1.132 of 37 C.F.R. or of any other evidence entered by the Examiner and relied upon by Appellants in the Appeal.

RELATED PROCEEDINGS APPENDIX

There are no related proceedings to the current proceeding.

Austin_1 525940v.2